Flora H. McKenzie v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, Harold J. Whiting, W. Verl Whiting and J. Melvis Haymond, dba Whiting and Haymond, and Western National Indemnity Company : Brief of Plaintiff by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Flora H. McKenzie v. The Industrial Commission
of Utah, Harold J. Whiting, W. Verl Whiting and J.
Melvis Haymond, dba Whiting and Haymond, and
Western National Indemnity Company : Brief of
Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
McKay, Burton, Nielsen and Richards; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McKenzie v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 7259 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/995
'7259 
In the 
-SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA H. ·.:McKENZIE, wido'v of 
~~n McKenzie, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
' vs. 
·t~JIE·INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAROLD J. WHITING, 
'V/. ·VERL WHITING ~and J. MEL.: 
\TIN HAYMOND, doing business as 
WHITING. and HAYMOND, Con-
tractors,_ and WESTERN 'NA-
'TIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
·a oorpora.tion, 
Defetn&a;nts. 
'PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
7259 
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN 
AND RICHARDS, 
At·torneys for Plaintiff .. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ----·-········································-------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -----------·-·····------------------------------------------------············ 3 
ASSIGN"MEN"TS OF ERROR -----------·-------------------------------------------------------·---- 8 
POINTS REIJED UPON -----------------------·-------------------------------------------------------- 9 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I. INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
FINDING THAT DECEDENT OBTAINED PERMISSION 
TO RIDE IN AUTOMOBILE ---------------------------------------------------------- 9 
POINT II. EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT TRANSPORTA-
TION WAS FURNISHED AS AN INCIDENT OF DECE-
DENT'S EMPLOYMENT -------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 
Authorities Cited 
Blankinship Co. v. Brown (Ark.), 208 S. W. 778 ----------·------------------------- 15 
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U. S. 469; 67 Sup. Ct. 801; 
91 L. Ed. 1028 -------------------------------------------------------C-------------------------------- 16 
California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident 
Commission, 21 Cal. (2d) 461; 132 Pac. (2d) 815 ------------------·----- 19 
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418; 44 Supt. Ct. 
142; 68 L. Ed. 366; 30 A. L. R. 532 ------------------------------------------------------ 11 
Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Jones, (Tex.) 195 S. W. 
(2d) 810 -----------------------------·-------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463; 169 S. W. (2d) 579 ______________________ 14 
Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Ins. Co,. 64 Colo. 480; 
174 Pac. 589; 3 A. L. R. 1336 --------------------------------------·----------------------- 15 
Jiminez v. Liberty Farms Co., 78 Cal. App. (2d) 458; 177 Pac. 
(2d) 785 -------------------------------------·-·-·------------------------------------------------------ 15 
Johnson v. Weise, 125 Conn. 238; 5 Atl. (2d) 19 --·--····--------------·--····-····· 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Johnston v. Penwell (Okla.) 175 Pac. (2d) 266 --------------·-------····-·-····· 15 
Konopka v. Jackson County Road Commission, 270 Mich. 174; 
258 N. W. 429; 97 A. L. R. 552 --------------·-------------------·------··----······-·· 17 
Lamm v. Silver Falls Timber Co., 133 Ore. 468; 286 Pac. 527 ................ 12 
Laudry v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 153 So. 74 ........................ 19 
Latham v. Southern Fish & Grocery Co., 181 S. E. 640 ............................ 19 
London Guarantee & Ac.ciden't Co. v. Franzee (Utah, 1947), 185 
Pac. (2d) 284 -----------------------------------------------------------------------.. ·----·-------- 20 
McGeorge Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 180 Okla. 346; 
69 Pac. (2d) 320 ·········--····························-····--------·····--------·-··············· 19 
Myland v. Maryland Casualty Co. (La.) 28 So. (2d), 351 .................... 15 
Pearson v. Aluminum Company of America, (Wash.) 161 Pac. 
(2d) 169 ·----·-························································································· 15 
Thomas v. Chickasaw Saw Mill, Inc. (La.), 23 So. (2d) 701 ................ 17 
Thompson v. Bradford Motor Freight Line, 148 So. 79 .......................... 19 
Vaughn v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. (Tenn.) 184 S. W. 
(2d) 566 ··············································································--··············· 15 
Venho v. Ostrander Ry. & Timber Co., 185 Wash. 138; 52 Pac. 
(2d) 1167 ······························································································ 16 
Wells v. Cutter, 90 Colo. 111; 6 Pac. (2d) 459 ........................................ 15 
Annotations 
10 A. L. R. 169 ............................................................................................ 19 
21 A. L. R. 1223 ............................................................................................ 19 
24 A. L. R. 1233 ...................................................................................... 19, 20 
62 A. L. R. 1438. ................... . ......................................... 20 
145 A. L. R. 1033 ....................... -----------·············· .......................................... 20 
TEXT BOOKS 
Bradbury on Workmen's Compensation (3d Ed.) Page 48 .................... 16 
Schneider on Workmen's Compensation (2d Ed.) Sec. 265 ................ 19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.l 
.l 
\ 
...... 
J! 
) 
) 
In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA H. 1IeKENZIE, widow of 
Owen MeKenzie, decHa:sed, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAROLD J. WHITING, 
W. VERL WHITING 1and J. MEL-
YIN HAYl\IOND, doing business as 
WHITING and HAYMOND, Con-
tractors, and WESTERN NA-
TIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
7259 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Thi'S action has been brought for the purpo'se of hav-
ing this Court review an order of the Industrial Commis-
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sion of Utah denying the plaintiff death benefits on ac-
count of the death of her husband Owen McKenzie. 
Plaintiff is. the surviving widow and was dependent upon 
Mr. McKenzie for her support prior to his de'ath. 
The defendants Harold J. Whiting, W. Veri Whiting 
and J. Melvin Haymond are co-partners doing business 
under the name and style of Whiting and Haymond, Con-
tractors, engaged in 'the business of general contracting 
and construction work, with their principal place of busi-
ness located a;t Springville, Utah, where the deceased 
resided prior to his. death. 
Mr. McKenzie died on December 6, 1947, as a result 
of injuries received in an automobile 'accident on Novem-
ber 29, 1947. The accident occurred at the intersection 
of Fifth Eas't and Thirty-ninth South Streets, in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, while decedent was riding in an auto-
mobile owned by Whiting and Haymond (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Company"), and being operated by J. 
M. Cranmer, the Company superintendent. The auto-
mobile was being operated at Company expense and waR 
being used for 'the purpose of bringing Mr. Cranmer, 
.Mr. McKenzie and others from Garland, Utah, to their 
respective homes in Springvine, Uta:h. 
On May 25, 1948 the plaintiff filed her application 
for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation 
Law. Thereafter a hearing was held on the lOth day of 
August, 1948, at Provo, Utah. On August 24, 1948, the 
Com1nission rendered its decision, in which it found that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
the accident did no't arise out of or in the course of the 
employment of the deceased by the defendant Company. 
On September 22, 19±8, a petition for rehearing was 
filed, setting forth several grounds of error, which said 
petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on October 
5, 1948, in consequence of which plaintiff, on the 4th day 
of November, 1948, filed her peti'tion in this court seek-
ing a review of the C01nnrission 's order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
There is very little, if any, material conflict in the 
evidence as to the facts. The evidence discloses that the 
deceased, Owen McKenzie had worked for 1:he Company 
since about 1942; that his position during that time was 
either as foreman or construction superintendent (R. 19). 
The superintendent of construction is the person who has 
immediate charge of a particular construction job, while 
the foreman is the person worh-ing immediate1y under the 
superintendent (R. 21, 32). At the time of the accident, 
and for approxin1ately 'three 1nonths prior thereto, Mr. 
McKenzie had been working on a construction job near 
Garland, Utah, referred to in the record as the" Garland 
job". His work had been that of grade foreman under 
Mr. J. M. Craniner, who was the superintendent in 
charge (R. 8, 30). Prior to the Garland job Mr. McKen-
zie had been employed at :Malad, Idaho, where he was 
superintendent in charge and Mr. Cranmer was employed 
as foreman under him. (R. 3). 
The superintendent in charge of construction wa:;: 
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always furnished a pick-up truck by the Company for his 
use on the job (R. p. 34). As stated by Mr. Harold J. 
Whiting, one of the partners, "We furnish a pick-up 
truck on each job that the superintendent has charge of 
and is used for bringing parts back and forth from Salt 
Lake or Springville or any o't:her place." (R. 78) He 
further testified that the pick-up truck is under the con-
trol and supervision of the superintendent, and that Mr. 
Cranmer was not given any orders as to what particular 
use he i:lhould make of the truck. As a mat'ter of fact, it 
was 'left up to the ''discretion of the general superintend-
E'nt as to how he used that pick-up" (R. 85 ). 
At times, when Mr. McKenzie was working on jobs 
where it was possible, he came home every week-end. 
"\Vhile he was the superintendent he came home on Satur-
day af'ternoons in the pick-up truck, which was either 
left at his residence or was taken down to the Company 
shops in Springville (R. 9, 11, 19, 20, 23). Occasionally 
it was necessary for him to pick up parts or to have the 
truck serviced. (R. 15, 28) On both the Garland and 
Malad jobs ~Ir. McKenzie had come home ,every week-end 
in the pick-up truck (R. 10, 11, 22, 23, 31), with the ex-
ception of one occasion, when he came hmne from the 
Garland job with a :Mr. Harwood (R. 20, 24). On the 
smne occasion Mr. Cranmer and others rode with Mr. 
Fullmer, because "there were so many men to come 
down." (R. 35) 
Prior to working at Malad, .Mr. l\fcKenzie had 
worked at Boise, Idaho. While working on this job he 
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did not come home every week-€nd because it was too 
far (R. 14), but he was taken to 'the job by company 
transportation, and on one occasion was brought home 
in a Company car (R. 12). Thereafter, when he returned 
to Boise, the Company furnished his transportation on 
the train ( R. 13, 24) . 
Mr. McKenzie usuafiy had someone else drive the 
pick-up truck for him while he was superintendent (R. 
20). On the :Malad job Mr. Cranmer had frequently 
driven the car for Mr. McKenzie, and went with the 
superintendent when he made trips (R. 50). Mr. Cran-
mer testified that it was the custom and practice for him 
to ride with ~ir. :McKenzie when 1the latter was superin-
tendent, and that this same practice was followed when 
Mr. Cranmer became superintendent and Mr. McKenzie 
acted as foreman (R. 51). As a matter of fact, Mr. Mc-
Kenzie always rode with Mr. Cranmer while on the Gar-
land job with the exception of the one week-end previ-
ously indicated (R. 52). 
l't was also testified that other employees front 
Springville had their ears at Garland and drove to and 
from the place of mnp1oyment, going home on week-ends 
(R. 26, 42). With respect to such employees the Com-
pany did not furnish any gasoline or otherwise pay the 
expenses of transportation (R. 43, 58). But if there was 
no way for the1n to get hmne, they would ride in 'the pick-
up (R. 49). There were also a number of men employed 
at Garland from other towns, including Logan and 
:l\falad. These men abo used their own means of trans-
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portation to and from work (R. 65, 71, 76). 
The Company maintained living quarters for the 
men at the place of employment and also opera!ted a cook 
house where its employees w.ere permitted to eat during 
the week (although 'the employees paid for their meals) 
( R. 33, 45). However, it was not the policy of the company 
to leave its employees on the job for the week-end (R. 51, 
67), except for one person who was left to look after the 
equipment. On such week-ends no facilities were avail-
able for eating, so that the person was required to go to 
the nearest community (R. 32, 33, 61, 63). 
The operations of the Company usually ceased on 
Saturday afternoon around two o'clock. All of the em-
ployees, including the foreman and superintenden't, were 
paid on an hourly rate, and their pay ceased at the time 
they stopped work (R. 79). On the day of the accident 
the men ceased work at approximately 2 o'clock P.M. 
~ir. Harold Whiting was present on the job with the 
Studebaker automobile, and because he desired to use 
the pick-up truck, he advised ~ir. Cranmer to take the 
Studebaker in order to go home (R. 34). Mr. Cranmer 
further stated that it was ·because he and Mr. :McKenzie 
wanted a ride that Mr. Whiting authorized them to take 
the car in order to bring the fellows that were there home 
(R. 37). :Jfr. Whiting advised another of the employees 
CMr. Arthur C. Fryer) that the car was going home, and 
asked hnn if he did not wan't to go along. At that time 
Mr. 'Vhiting stated that he needed the pick-up, so that 
::\lr. Cranmer was going to take the Studebaker (R. 59). 
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:Mr. Whiting also testified that the superintendent on 
the job had the use of the pick-up truck; that he knew 
it was being used for the purpose of bringing en1ployees 
to Springville and return then1 to the job, and that such 
action 1net "ith his approval (R. 91, 92). It was also 
further stated by ~Ir. Cranmer that the purpose for 
which he had the truck was ''hauling 'things around, 
back and forth, and taking men back to work and bringing 
them home, and any break-down we had, to hau'l things.'' 
(R. 32). 
On the afternoon in question the men ceased work 
about 2 o'clock P.M., at which time Mr. Cranmer was 
advised by :Mr. Whiting to take the Studebaker auto-
mobile ra!ther than the pick-up truck. In addition to 
Mr. Cranmer and Mr. McKenzie, Mr. Arthur Fryer, Mr. 
Clarence Shoell, ~Ir. Lee Taylor and another man rode 
in the automobile. In driving through Salt Lake City, 
:Nir. Cranmer drove to Fifth East and Twenty-first 
South, where one person left the automobile. There-
after, Mr. Crann1er turned South on Fifth East and 
drove 'to Thirty-ninth South, \vhere the accident occurred 
at the intersection of Fifth East and Thirty-ninth South. 
There a traffic semaphore signal was operating, evidenc-
ing a red signal for traffic approaching from the north. 
Mr. Cranmer failed to stop and proceeded into the inter-
section, where the au'ton1obile collided with a Buick auto-
mobile being operated eastwardly on Thirty-ninth 'South 
Street. The in1pact occurred over the right front door 
on the side where 1\fr. l'vicKenzie was seated, thereby 
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crushing him between the cars and causing him injuries 
from which he later died. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Plaintiff's pet~tion herein sets forth as alleged error 
on the part of the Industrial Commission the following: 
1. The Commision erred in finding that the de-
ceased ''of his own volition and initiative elected to leave 
his place of employment and go to his home in Spring-
ville, Utah, over the week-end; that he obtained permis-
sion to ride to his home in Springville, Utah, in a Com-
pany-owned car, driven by Mr. J. M. Cranmer, superin-
tendent of construction for the Company.'' 
2. The Commission erred in finding ''that the in-
jury did not arise out of or in the course of" decedent's 
emp:loyment. 
3. The Commission erred in failing to find 'that the 
defendant company furnished transportation to the de-
cedent as an incident to and part of decedent's employ-
ment with the defendant company. 
4. The Commission erred in failing to find that the 
injury and subsequent dea!t:h arose out of or in the course 
of decedent's employment with the defendant company. 
5. The Com1nission erred in failing to find that 
the applicant is entitled to death benefits resulting from 
the accidental death of Owen ·McKenzie, dec·eased. 
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POINTS RELIED UPON. 
For 1the purpose of this brief the foregoing alleged 
errors can be grouped into two categories for argument: 
1. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding 
that the decedent obtained permission to ride in the 
company-owned car on the day of the accident. 
2. The evidence is undisputed tha!t transportation 
to and from Springville, Utah, was furnished by defend-
ant company as an incident of decedent's employment. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING THAT DECEDENT OBTAINED 
PERMISSION TO RIDE IN DEFENDANT'S AUTO-
MOBLE. 
Nowhere in the record was it stated either by the 
individual defendants or by Mr. Cranmer that the de-
cedent at any 1time requested permission to ride home in 
the company-owned car. Wbile this point itself is not 
con~lusive as to decedent's status at the time the accident 
occurred, nevertheless it is evident 'that the Industrial 
Commission concluded from the evidence that the acci-
dent did not arise out of the couri'le of decedent's employ-
ment with the defendant company because of the finding 
that he had reques'ted permission to ride in the auto-
mobile, and therefore the relationship of en1ployer and 
employee could not exist at the time of the accident. It is 
plaintiff's contention that if the court should determine 
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that the Commission erred in finding that decedent ob-
tained permission to ride in defendant's car on the day 
the accident occurred, the decision of 'the Commission 
must be reversed for the reason that such finding sup-
ports and gives weight to the ultimate finding that the 
accident did not arise out of or in ~the course of decedent's 
employinent with the defendant company. 
As hereinbefore related, Mr. McKenzie and Mr. 
Cranmer had worked closely together on this and other 
jobs where one had been superintendent and the other 
the foreman. According to Mr. Cranmer, it was cus'tom 
and practice for him to ride with Mr. 1\:fcKenzie when 
the latter was superintendent, and this same custom was 
continued on the Garland job, when Mr. Cranmer became 
superintendent and Mr. 1[cKenzie acted as foreman (R. 
51). The truck was furnished to Mr. Cranmer for the 
purpose of ''hauling things around, back and forth, and 
taking men back to work and bringing them home.'' (R. 
32) 
?\lr. Harold Whiting, one of the partners, knew that 
the truck was being used for the purpose of bringing em-
ployees to Springville and returning them to the job, and 
such action met with his approval (R. 91, 92). The com-
pany closed up the job on Saturday afternoons and did 
not care to have any of the employees remain at the 
camp excepting one left to look after the equipment (R. 
51, 61). Mr. :McKenzie had ridden home with Mr. Cran-
Iner on every week-end when l\f r. Cranmer drove a com-
pany vehicle to Springville, and ~[ r. Cranmer had driven 
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either the pick-up or the Studebaker home every week-
end except one, from the t.hne the Garland job was com-
menced in September. 
In view of this undisputed testimony there appears 
to be no basis for the finding made by the Commission 
that ~fr. )[cl(enzie voluntarily left the job and obtained 
permission to ride home with ~fr. Cranmer in the com-
pany -owned \ehicle. 
II. 
THE EYIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT 
TRANSPORTATION TO A.ND. FROM SPRING-
VILLE, UTAH, WAS FURNISHED BY DEFEND-
ANT CO~fp ANY AS AN INCIDENT OF DECE-
DENT'S EMPLOYMENT. 
At the outset we are confronted with the general 
rule heretofore announced by this Court that an accident 
occurring to an employee while traveling to or from 
work does not arise out of or in the course of his em-
ployment. Thi~ rule, however, is not without exception. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in a very early 
case arising in this State enunciated the policy to be 
followed in deterining the question of liability under 
\V. orkmen 's Compensation laws. 
In the case of C1tdnhy Packing Co. ·1:. Parr:a:mo're, 
263 U. S. 418; 4-l- Sup. Ct. 153; 68 L. Ed. 366; 30 A. L. R. 
532, the Cotu't said: 
'• The !liability is based, not upon any act or 
mnission of the en1ployer, but upon the existence 
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12 
of the relationship which the ·employee bears to 
the employment because of and in the course of 
which he has been injured. And this is no1t to 
impose liability upon one person for an injury 
sustained by another with which the former has 
no ·connection; but it is to say, that it is enough 
if there be a causal connection between the in-
jury and the business in which he employs the 
latter-a connection substantially contributory, 
though it need not be the sole or proximate cause. 
Legislation which imposes liability for an injury 
thus related to the employment, among other 
justifying circumstances, has a tendency to .pro-
nlote a more equitabie dis1tribution of the economic 
burdens in cases of personal injury or death re-
sulting from aecidents in the course of industrial 
employment, and is a matter of sufficient pub-
lic ·concern (Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing-
ton, 243 U. S. 239, 61 L. Ed. 697, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
260, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642, 13 N.C.C.A. 927), to 
escape condemnation as arbitrary, capricious, or 
clearly unreasonable. Whether a given accident 
is so related or incident 1to the business must 
depend upon its own particular circumstances. 
No exact formula can be ·laid down which will 
automatically solve every case. The fact that the 
acddent happens upon a pub'Lic road or at a 
railroad ·crO'ssing, and that the danger is one to 
which the general public is likewise exposed is 
not conclusive against the existence of such causal 
relationship, if the danger be one to whieh the 
employee, by reason of and in connection with his 
employment, is subjected peculiarly or to an ah-
normal degree.'' 
In L~amm~ v. Silver Fall's Timber Co., 133 Ore. 468; 
286 Pac. 527, the Supreme Court of Oregon said: 
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• 
4 Since the courts have recognized the broad 
hlunane purposes of the act, they have readily 
pereeived that the mere fact 1that the injury befell 
the claiu1ant, at a moment when he was not 
performing manual ~:abor for his employer, does 
not necessarily prove that the -accident did not 
arise out of or in the course of the employment. 
The words just mentioned which are a par1t ·of 
most of the acts are never qualified by the limita-
tion that the injury must have been inflicted dur-
ing regular working hours. Honaker & Feeney 
v. Hartley, 140 V a. 1, 124 S.E. 220. From Larke 
v. John Hancock ~1utual Life Insurance Co., 90 
Conn. 303, 97 Atl. 320, 321 L. R. A. 1916E, 584, 
\\Te quote: 'The period of employment has some-
tinles been held to eover a .period other tlran 
that for which wages are paid.' And from our 
own decision in Wells v. Clark & Wilson Lumber 
Co., 114 Or. 297, 235 P. 283, 290, the following i's 
taken : 'Yet one may be under such a contract 
with another as to be a present emp!loyee, al-
though the actual work incident to the employ-
rnent may not be beglm until a future day.' And 
since all workmen's compensation legislation is 
noticeably inspired by the English act, the follow-
ing language quoted from John Stewart & Son 
Y. Longhurst (1917) A. C. 249, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 
196, is appropria:te: 'It has been established by 
a series of decisions that employment for the pur-
poses of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1nay 
in many cases be regarded as exisiting before the 
actual work has ceased.' In other words, the 
work rnay suspend and yet the employment con-
tinue. \Ve shal1 later refer to two cases which 
applied the'se principles in a very practical man-
ner. In the one, the deceased employee had main-
tained his hmne in ~ orth Dakota, but performed 
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his. S'ervices in Minnesota. He lost his life while 
returning from 'the latter state to his home to 
spend the week-end. In the other case, 'a school 
teacher was. killed at a railroad crossing while 
on her way to attend a teacher's institute. It was 
de'sirable that she should attend the institute, but 
the law did not make attendance mandatory. In 
both cases, the courts heid that the death arose 
in an 'accident arising out of and in 'the cours·e 
of his employment' and compensation was 
ordered.'' 
In consequence of the foregoing policy it has fre-
quently happened, as stated by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in the Lamm case, Supra, that an e1npioyee is 
granted compensation ''even though his hours of service 
have not yet begun, or have ended, and even though he 
is not upon ;the premises of his emp1oyer, engaged in 
physical service of the latter.'' 
One of the earliest exceptions to the general rule 
stated above, and which has been generally accepted in 
the courts throughout the United States, is 'that where 
transportation to or from the place of employment is 
furnished by the en1ployer as an incident of the contract 
of employment, an aeciden't, occurring while thus travel-
to or from the place of employment, arises out of or in 
the course of such employment. 
See, Hwnt·err v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463; 169 S. W. 
(2d) 579 (where a timber contractor acquiesced in the 
custom of his employees riding to and frmn the log woods 
on one of the trucks of a sub-contractor whose compen-
, 
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sation wa:~ paid by t:he contractor); Jiminez v. Liberty 
Farms Co., 78 Cal. App. (2d) 458; 177 Pac. (2d) 785 
(where a farm ernployee was injured while riding on a 
truck furnished by the ernployer) ; Wells v. Cutter, 90 
Colo. 111; 6 Pac. (2d) 459; Johnso·n v. Weise, 125 Conn. 
238; 3 Atl. (2d) 19; 1llyland v. Jlaryland Casualty Co. 
(La.) 28 So. (2d) 351 (where the employer furnished 
transportation to and from work and charged a small 
fee therefor, but which fee was not sufficient to cover 
the entire operation cost. In this case the Court stated 
that that the faet that 'the employer could have discon-
tinued the service at any time was immaterial) ; Employ-
e.rs R('insura;nce OorporiatiJon v. Jones (Tex.) 195 S. W. 
(2d) 810; v·aughn v. St,anaard Sll!rety & Oa.sualty Co. 
(Tenn.) 184 ~- W. (2d) 566 (where the company per-
mitted jts employees 'to ride home on con1pany trucks but 
did not pay thern for the time involved, and authorized 
~uch employees to go home hy any means of transporta-
tion they desired); Johnson v. Penwell (Okla.) 175 Pac. 
( 2<L) 266 (where the traction con1pany pennitted its em-
plo~·ee~ to ride the company buses 1:o the place of employ-
ment); Pears,on r. Aluminum Company of Ame.rioa 
( \Va~l1.) 161 Pae. ( 2d) 169 (where the cornpany furnished 
n lm~ to transport its workers to and from the place of 
employrnent.) 
A good discussion of the poliey involved in such 
<'ases i~ found in BlanJ..iin.-.,·hilp Co. v. Bro1cn (Ark.) 208 
N. "r· (:2d) 778, and in Industrial Com:mission v. Aetna 
!Jifc Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480; 174 Pac. 589; 3 A.L.R.1336. 
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Bradbury on Worlanen's Compensation, 3 Ed., Page 
48, states the rule as follows : 
"If an employee is conveyed to and from his 
_work in a conveyance furnished by the employer, 
unde-r an ·express or an implied contract to furnish 
such conveyance, ·an injury to an employee while 
on the journey, arises out of the employment." 
Again in the case of Venho v. Ost.r:ander Ry. & 
Timber Co., 185 Wash. 138; 52 Pac. (2d) 1167, the Su-
preme Court of Washington held: 
''When a worlanan is 'SO injured, while being 
transported in 'a vehicle furnished by his em-
ployer as an incident of the employment, he is 
within 'the course of his employment', as con-
telnp,lated by the act. In other words, when the 
vehicle is supplied by the employer for the mutual 
benefit of himself and the workman to facilitate 
the progress of the work, the employment begins 
when the worlanan enters the vehicle and ends 
when he leaves it on the termination of his labor. 
This exception to the rule may arise either as the 
result of custom or contract, ·express or implied. 
It may be implied from the nature 'and circum-
stances of the employment ·and the cus't.onl of the 
employer to furnish transportation." (Citing 
authorities.) 
Nor is it necessary that the employee be subject to 
·the employer's control during the journey. 
In the recent case of Cardillo v. L~berty Mutual Ins. 
Co., 330 U. S. 469; 67 Sup. Ct. 801; 91 L. Ed. 1028, the 
Supre1ne Court of the United States held: 
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·'The mere fact that at the moment of the 
injury, during the journey to or from the work 
site, the employee is not actually doing the work 
he is prin1arily hired to do, or that his acts 'and 
movements are not subject to the emp~oyer's con-
trol, does not render him any less in the service 
of his employer." 
And in the case of Thomas v. Chickasaw Saw Mill, 
Inc. (La.), 23 So. (2d) 701, where the plaintiff was in-
jured while riding home from work on a wagon belong-
ing to the defendant company, the Court determined 
that a contract for transportation may be implied from 
the acts of the employer. In that case, as here, the em-
ployer knew that the employees were riding on the 
employer's conveyance, which was used in connection 
with the business in which he was engaged. The Court 
there held: 
·'However, the rule wi'th regard to trans-
portation has one well-known modification as 
there are several decisions which hold that a con-
tract with necessary transportation may be im-
plied from the acts of the employer who 'tacitly 
permits his employee to ride to and from work 
on a conveyance used for some purpose in con-
nection with the business in which he is engaged. 
See vValker V. .Jiills Engineering Construction 
Co., 152 So. 83." 
In the case of Konopka v. Jackson County Ro1ad 
Commission, 270 Mich. 174; 258 N. W. 429; 97 A. L. R. 
;-l;l2, the Court sta!ted the law to be: 
''The law se·ems rather definitely settled that 
in cases where the contract of employment ex-
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pressly includes conveyance of ·the employee to or 
from his place of work, an accident arising out of 
such transportation and resuUing in an injury to 
the employee is compensable. It is so held because 
such an 'accident arises both out of and in the 
course of the employment. Shneider's Workmen's 
Compensation Law (2d Ed.), S.ec. 265. We think 
both on re·ason and on respectable authority the 
holding should be the same where, as in this case, 
incident to the emp;loyment contraclt it is contem-
plated and understood by both the employer and 
the employee that the former will transport the 
latter 'to or from the place where the work is done. 
And especially should such be the rule when under 
a uniform course of conduct the employer does so 
convey the employee. We do not think the legal 
aspect is affected by the fact that the employee 
may at his option adopt ·other means of convey-
ance. The arrangement for conveyance of the 
ernployee hy the employer, when rrrade, is obvi-
ously for their mutual advantage; and from the 
inception of the journey the employee in a very 
large sense is under the controil of the employer. 
Sulrely the safety or the pe.ril of the .iourney is 
witMin the C10ntr.ol of the employer. The transpor-
tation is such an essential incident of the 
employn1ent as to be a par't of it. Hence, if an 
accident arises out of the transportation so pro-
vided, it is an 'accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employment. And under the circum-
stances presented here, it does not ·seem that a 
different legal aspect was presented merely 
because the transportation was in a truck owned 
and operated by another ·emp~oyee rather than in 
a truck belonging to and operated by the em-
ployer." (Italics supplied) 
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In the Konopka case the employee was injured while 
riding in a vehicle owned and operated by another em-
ployee and at a time when neither party was being paid 
for any services by the employer, nor was the employee 
paid for the use of his truck in connection with the trans-
portation of other employees. The test is, as stated by 
the Court in that case, "whether, under the contract of 
employment, construed in the light of all the attendant 
circumstances, there is either an express or implied 
undertaking by the employer to provide the trans-
portation.'' 
See also Laudry v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 
153 So. 7 4, where a road crew o:perating road equipment, 
which was ordinarily returned to the shops at night, 
left the equipment on the highway and caught a ride 
home in another conveyance. The Court there held that 
the road crew, being usually transported home on the 
equipment, were still in the course of their employment 
when being transported by another means of conveyance. 
See also, Thompson v. Bradford Motor 
Freight Line, 148 So. 79; La'tham v. Southern 
Fish & Grocery Co., 181 S. E. 640; McGeorge 
Corporation v. Industrial Commis'Sion, 180 Okra. 
346; 69 Pae. (2d) 320; California Casualty In-
denmity Exchange v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 21 Cal ( 2d) 461 ; 132 Pac. ( 2d) 815 ; 
Schneider on Workmen's Cmnpensation ( 2d Ed.) 
~ec. 265 
Numerous authorities can be found cited in the 
following A. L. R. Annotations: 10 A. L. R. 169; 21 A. L. 
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R. 1223; 24 A. L. R. 1233; 62 A. L. R. 1438; 145 A. L. R. 
1033. 
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court of 
this Sta:te involved a similar situation ~o the one pre-
sented in the instant matter. In the case of London Guar-
antee & Accident Co. v. Frazee (Utah, 1947), 185 Pac. 
(2d) 284, the Court was concerned with the status of 
one Frazee during the time he was being transported 
over his employer's railway line from his home to his 
place of employment. The transportation was furnished 
free of charge, but the employee was not paid for the 
time involved. The Court, in concluding that the rela-
tionship of employer and employee existed from the 
time the employee boarded the employer's conveyance, 
stated: 
''An arrangement whereby the employer 
agrees to have the employment commence at the 
time employee boards the train may be unusual, 
but. it is not so unusual as to be impossible of be-
lief, even though the employee has no duties to 
perform, can select another means of conveyance, 
is not paid f.or his time spent in re1turning horne 
from the job, is riding a regularly seheduled 
passenger train, i's tpaid by the month, and is 
riding on a pass. All of these elements have a 
bearing on the construc!tion of the contract of 
employment. They are elements which can he con-
sidered in determining when the servant affix·ed 
himself to his day's work.'' 
Applying the foregoing rules to the facts in the 
instant case, which facts are not in dispute and there-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
fore involve a question of law for this Court to pass 
upon, the conclusion is inescapable that the decedent 
was furnished transportation in connection with his 
employment and as an incident thereof. During the 
entire time that he had worked for· the defendant com-
pany he had had the use of a company vehicle to travel 
from the job to his home in Springville and return. 
When he was too far removed from home he did not 
return every week-end; but on occasions when he did 
return, the company paid his transportation back to 
the job. The company at all times furnished a pickup 
truck for the use of the superintendent, knew that he 
used it for the purpose of transporting some employees, 
and acquiesced therein. 
Although there is evidence in the record that the 
employees other than the foreman and superintendent 
drove their own automobiles to the job, or obtained 
other means of 'transportation for themselves, there is 
no evidence that either the superintendent or the fore-
man at any time drove their own vehicles, but in all 
instances except one used company transportation to 
go to and from the job. The fact that the decedent was 
a foreman or a superintendent at all times while he 
worked for the company places him in a different cate-
gory frmn the regular employees. As a supervisor he 
was entitled to and did receive more consideration from 
his employer. Since the employer left it to the discretion 
of 'the superintendent as to how the cmnpany vehicle 
would be used, and since the superintendent himself 
stated that it was used for the purpose of transporting 
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himse'lf and others to and from the job (and further 
stated that on the day in question the use of the Stude-
baker automobile was given in order that he and Mr. 
McKenzie rnight have a rneans of transportation from the 
job to Springville, Utah), the evidence conclusively 
establishes that the transportation furnished to the 
superintendent and the foreman was incidental to their 
employment, and that the relationship of employer and 
employee existed while the decedent was traveling from 
the job to his home in Springville. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submi't that the uncontradicted 
evidence establishes: (1) that the decedent, Owen Mc-
Kenzie did not seek permission to ride in the company 
vehicle on the day in question from the Garland job to 
his home in Springville, Utah, but that on the contrary, 
such transportation was furnished t.o him by the com-
pany in accordance with the custom and practice, and 
as a part of and incident to his employment with such 
company; ( 2) that while the decedent was riding in the 
company automobile fron1 the job to his home, the s'tatus 
of employer and employee existed, so that the accident 
which occurred on the trip homeward arose out of and 
in the course of such employment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN 
AND RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
I 
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